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Statement of Jurisdiction
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2) (d) (appeals from
circuit courts) and 78-2a-3(2) (f) (appeals from a court of record
in non-felony criminal cases).

Judgment of Conviction was

entered against the defendant/appellant David N. Lynch

("Mr.

Lynch") for disorderly conduct (an infraction) on April 26, 1994
by Judge Joseph I. Dimick of the Fourth Circuit Court, Utah
County.

Mr. Lynch's Notice of Appeal was filed within 30 days

later on May 20, 1994.
Issues on Appeal and Standard of Review
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding Mr. Lynch

guilty of disorderly conduct without receiving any evidence in
connection with that charge, but instead taking "judicial notice"
of evidence presented two months earlier to a jury on a different
charge which had resulted in a mistrial.
Standard of Review:

This is an issue of law and this

Court need accord no deference to the ruling of the trial court,
but should review it for correctness.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

932 (Utah 1994).
2.

Whether American Fork City failed to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of its amended
charge of disorderly conduct.

1

Standard of Review: This is a primarily an issue of
fact.

Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous

standard.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances. and Rules

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1990) :
Presumption of innocence -- "Element of the offense"
defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of the
offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or
forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
American Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102.
Ann. § 76-9-102 (1990))

(Identical to Utah Code

Disorderly conduct.
(1) A person is guilty or disorderly conduct if:
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof:
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent,
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public
place; or
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private
place which can be heard in a public place; or
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language
or makes obscene gestures in a public place; or
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian
traffic.
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section,
means any place to which the public or a substantial
group of the public has access and includes but is not
limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings,
transport facilities, and shops.

2

(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the
offense continues after a request by a person to
desist. Otherwise it is an infraction.
Utah Rules of Evidence 201(b):
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.
Statement of the Case
This appeal is from a Judgment of Conviction entered
against Mr. Lynch by Judge Dimick of the Fourth Circuit Court on
a charge of disorderly conduct, an infraction.
On November 2, 1993, the plaintiff and appellee,
American Fork City ("American Fork"), filed an Information
against Mr. Lynch alleging that he had violated American Fork
City Ordinance § 76-8-305 (identical to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8305), interference with a peace office making a lawful arrest, a
class B misdemeanor.

(R. 1, copy at Addendum 1.)

not guilty and demanded a trial by jury.

Mr. Lynch pled

A jury trial was held

on February 17-18, 1994, after which the trial court declared a
mistrial when the four person jury was unable to reach a verdict.
(R. 49.)

Two jurors were in favor of acquittal, and two were in

favor of conviction.
On March 14, 1994, American Fork City filed an Amended
Information against Mr. Lynch, this time alleging that his
conduct was an infraction of disorderly conduct, in violation of
American Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102.
3

(R. 62, copy at

Addendum 2.)

The City also filed a motion to strike Mr. Lynch's

jury demand on the basis that he did not have the right to a jury
trial on the infraction charge.

(R. 67.)

The trial court

granted the motion to strike the jury demand, and set the matter
for a bench trial on April 25, 1994.

(R. 73.)

At the bench trial on the infraction charge on April
25, 1994, the court did not receive any evidence, but instead
took "judicial notice" of the evidence that had been presented to
the jury on February 17-18, 1994 in connection with the class B
misdemeanor charge of interference with a lawful arrest.
Transcript of Apr. 25, 1994 hearing, copy at Addendum 3.)

(See
After

hearing the arguments of counsel for the parties, the court found
Mr. Lynch guilty of the disorderly conduct infraction and
sentenced him to pay a $50.00 fine.

(R. 76.)

Mr. Lynch filed a

Notice of Appeal three weeks later on May 20, 1994.

(R. 78.)

On September 12, 1994 the Court of Appeals issued a Sue
Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition.

Thereafter, American Fork

filed its Memorandum in Support of Summary Disposition in its
favor, and Mr. Lynch filed his Memorandum in Support of Summary
Reversal.

On October 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals entered an

Order denying summary disposition, stating the issues raised
therein are deferred pending plenary presentation and
consideration of the case.
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Statement of Facts
The only "facts" in the record regarding the disorderly
conduct infraction on appeal are the attempts by the trial court
and counsel at the hearing on April 25, 1994 to recollect the
evidence and testimony that had been presented over two months
previously, on February 17-18, 1994, at the jury trial on
American Forks initial class B misdemeanor charge of interference
with a lawful arrest.

(See Apr. 25, 1994 Hearing Transcript at

pp. 3-14, copy at Addendum 3.)

Therein, the trial court

summarized the earlier evidence as follows:
1.

American Fork police officers James Stewart and

Darren Falslev exchange vulgarity with Mr. Lynch's sons regarding
the officers detention of Mr. Lynch's niece named Kristen Harris
outside a convenience store.

The officers told the Lynch boys to

leave and they went home.
2.

Mr. Lynch later came to the scene where the

officers were detaining his niece, and he confronts the officers
and demands an accounting from them of the language that they had
used with his sons.

Mr. Lynch also asked the officers about the

status of their detention of his niece Kristen Harris.
3.

American Fork's witnesses (officers Stewart,

Falslev and dispatcher Kristine Johnson) testified that Mr. Lynch
used a load and shouting voice when talking to the officers about
their conduct.

5

4.

Mr. Lynch's witnesses (himself, his wife Katrina

Lynch, Kristen Harris, and Angela Edwards) denied that Mr. Lynch
shouted or argued with the officers, but said he had a brief
conversation with them and was told to leave after he told them
that he was planning on making a complaint for their conduct.
He began to leave, then he turned back to use the telephone by
the convenience store to notify his sister that her daughter was
being detained by the police, which further upset the officers.
Summary of Argument
The trial court committed plain error by taking
judicial notice of evidence that was presented over two months
earlier to a jury, on a different charge, as the sole basis to
convict Mr. Lynch of the charge of disorderly conduct.

Pursuant

to Utah Rules of Evidence 201(b) and controlling Utah case law,
judicial notice is only appropriate (1) where the prior
proceedings are in the same case, not a different case; (2) where
the judicially noticed facts are not reasonably disputed, as they
were here; and (3) where a transcript has been made for the court
to readily refer to, instead of vague recollections as occurred
in the instant case without a transcript.

All these requirements

for proper judicial notice were not following by the trial court.
Even if the trial court's recollection of the prior
proceedings was properly used by the trial court on the
disorderly conduct charge, that evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt
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to the disorderly conduct charge.

No evidence was presented by

American Fork, nor was there any finding made by the trial court,
on the essential element of intent.
The trial court's judgment of conviction should be
reversed.
Argument
The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Taking
Judicial Notice of the Prior Proceedings
Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as
follows:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.
Under this rule, the trial court can take judicial notice of
facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute," such as
administrative agency rules and records, Moore v. Utah Technical
College, 727 P.2d 634 (Utah 1986), or the day of the week of a
certain date, Independent Gas & Oil Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., 71
Utah 348, 266 P. 267 (1928).
A trial court can also take judicial notice of records
in prior proceedings before the court as long as such proceedings
(1) relate to the same case; (2) such proceedings are "not
subject to reasonable dispute;"

and (3) where a transcript of

the prior proceeding is before the judge.

In the instant case,

the trial court's decision to take judicial notice of the prior

7

proceeding was plain and manifest error since these three
requirements were not followed.
First, the court's judicial notice approach was
improper because the prior proceeding was in a different case
than the one tried to the court.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated on several occasions that "a court cannot in one case take
judicial notice of its own record in another and different case."
Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah
1933)(Industrial Commission erred in taking judicial notice of
its own records as to monies paid to plaintiff for prior claims
to the commission); Robison v. Kelley, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. 430,
431 (Utah 1927) (trial court erred in taking judicial notice of
prior foreclosure proceeding of plaintiff's property in a
subsequent case for waste of plaintiff's estate).

The first case

was No. 92100859, a class B misdemeanor, for interference with a
police officer making a lawful arrest, under American Fork
Ordinance § 76-8-305 (same as Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305).
copy at Addendum 1.)

(R. 1,

The second case (the one on appeal) was No.

93-1064, an infraction alleging disorderly conduct under a
separate and distinct American Fork ordinance (§ 76-9-102), with
separate and distinct elements than the earlier charge.
copy at Addendum 2.)

(R. 2,

The judicial notice approach certainly was

more efficient, but it was improper since the prior proceeding
was in a different case, with a different charge.
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Second, the prior evidence was not the type that was
"not subject to reasonable dispute" as required under Evidence
Rule 201(b).

The prior evidence was hotly disputed.

Mr. Lynch's

evidence was that he had acted reasonably and calmly when he
talked to the American Fork police officers about their swearing
at his sons, and about why they had his niece in their patrol
car.

American Fork, on the other hand, presented evidence that

Mr. Lynch had shouted at them.

The evidence was so disputed that

the jury could not reach a verdict; they were split two to two.
Also, in the second proceeding, the court and counsel for the
parties were not in agreement as to what evidence had been
presented in the prior trial.

See, e.g., April 25, 1994

Transcript at pp. 4-5, 9 (Addendum 3 hereto).
Third, no transcript of the first trial was available
for the court to review at the bench trial that took place over
two months later.

Judicial notice of prior proceedings requires

that such proceedings be transcribed as required by Rule 201(b).
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989) (trial court
properly refused to take judicial notice of prior proceedings
when transcript not provided as required by Rule 201(b));
Matthews v. State, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Idaho 1992) (court erred
in taking judicial notice of untranscribed trial proceedings).
"Facts may not be judicially noticed simply because they are
within the personal recollected knowledge of the judge."

Id.,

citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 147-
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48 (3rd Cir. 1975); Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Evidence § 5105.
It is apparent from a review of the transcript of the
April 25, 1994 bench hearing (Addendum 3 hereto) that the trial
court was unable to recall all the evidence that had been
presented earlier.

Without a transcript of the February trial,

the trial court's judgment of conviction on the later court trial
was compromised; it was not based on evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The court's decision on the amended charge was based on a

general impression and vague recollection of the prior evidence,
which in many respects was not applicable to the disorderly
conduct charge.

It was clear error for the court to take

judicial notice of the prior hearing without such hearing
transcribed as required by Rule 201(b)(2), Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Riche, 784 P.2d at 468; Matthews, 839 P.2d at 1221.
Fundamental constitutional rights of defendant Lynch

were sacrificed to the expediency of "judicial notice."

By

taking judicial notice of the entire case, defendant Lynch's
right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses
was denied, as was his right to present evidence in his own
behalf, and his right to due process of law.
§§ 7, 12; U.S. Const, amends. V, VI, XIV.

Utah Const. Art. I,

Had live evidence been

presented instead of the court trying to recollect what had been
presented two months earlier on a different charge, different and
more thorough arguments and reasoning would have been possible
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for Mr. Lynch and for the court.

Mr. Lynch would have been able

to cross-examine the witnesses on the different issues inherent
in the amended charge of disorderly conduct, such as whether Mr.
Lynch made "unreasonable noises," "intending to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof."

See Amended Information (Addendum 2 hereto); American

Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102 (identical to Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 9-102) .
Based on the foregoing, it was plain and manifest
error1 for the trial court to summarily convict Mr. Lynch of
disorderly conduct by simply recollecting what the evidence was
at the jury trial, that took place over two months earlier, on a
different charge, and which had resulted in a hung jury.

1

Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) provides: "Nothing in this
rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights although they were not brought to the
attention of the court." The trial court's error in taking
judicial notice of the entire case to convict Mr. Lynch of the
amended charge was obvious and harmful, and thus this Court can
review this issue even if his trial counsel failed to object.
See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1991); State v.
Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989); State v. Range1, 866 P.2d
607, 611 (Utah App. 1993) .
Alternatively, Mr. Lynch's trial counsel's failure to
object to the court's judicial notice approach was below the
standard of reasonable professional practice, and the conviction
must be reversed on the basis that Mr. Lynch was thereby denied
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
11

II.

Insufficient Evidence was Presented for a Disorderly
Conduct Conviction
If this Court determines that the trial court could not

adopt as "judicial notice" the disputed evidence of the prior
proceeding for the disorderly conduct trial, then the conviction
must be reversed for insufficient evidence since American Fork
presented no other evidence in support of its disorderly conduct
charge.

"To allow a conviction to stand that is not supported by

the evidence would be fundamental error," even if this argument
was not argued to the trial court.

State v. Govan, 744 P.2d 712,

717 (Ariz. App. 1987) .
Even if the evidence presented at the earlier
proceeding is deemed to have been appropriately considered in the
second proceeding, a review of the transcript of the second
proceeding (copy at Addendum 3) reveals that no evidence was
presented by American Fork on the element of intent.

Each

element of the disorderly conduct charge must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt for the judgment of conviction to enter.
Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1990).

Utah

The relevant elements of the

disorderly conduct offense are as follows:
(1)

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:

(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof:
(ii)
public place.

He makes unreasonable noises in a
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American Fork City Ordinance § 76-9-102 (identical to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-102).
The only "evidence" in the record of Mr. Lynch's intent
in conversing with the police officers was to confront them about
their comments towards his sons so that he might lodge a
complaint to their supervisors.

(Addendum 3 at pp. 5-6.)

There

was no evidence presented by American Fork that Mr. Lynch
intended to cause, or did in fact cause, public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm--at least none which was brought to the
attention of the trial court by American Fork, who had the burden
of proving this element beyond a reasonable doubt.

To marshal

the evidence, the only "evidence" recollected at the April 25,
1994 court trial was as to the volume and persistence of Mr.
Lynch, which evidence was disputed.

It is no crime to speak

loudly at a police officer absent evidence that a loud voice was
unreasonable under the circumstances, and that it was intended to
cause public alarm.

No evidence was before the court on these

elements, nor was any finding made as to these elements, as
manifest by the brief hearing transcript (copy at Addendum 3 ) .
The trial court's judgment that defendant Lynch was
guilty of the offense of disorderly conduct was not based on
evidence that established such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
That decision was based solely on the court's recollection of
evidence presented on a different charge, having different
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elements, in which the fact-finder there was unable to reach a
consensus.

Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.2
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Judgment of Conviction

against Mr. Lynch for disorderly conduct should be reversed.
DATED this ^/cA

day of February, 1995.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

/*A^> cs
^imes
D /
D. Gilson

ByC^

<ry/<z~&*-^

'Attorneys for Appellant

193\72976.01

2

Reversal, not remand, is the only appropriate result
because "[d]ouble jeopardy bars the retrial of a defendant where
an appellate court declares the evidence to be insufficient to
sustain a conviction." State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1115 (Utah
1989)(dissenting opinion); Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; U.S. Const,
amend. VI. Jeopardy attaches to court trials as well as to jury
trials. State v. Rumsev, 665 P.2d 48 (Ariz. 1983), aff'd, 467
U.S. 203 (1984).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
t^/Cr-

day of February, 1995 to the following:
James "Tucker" Hansen
HARDING & ASSOCIATES
306 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003
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Addendum Index
1.
Information filed November 2, 1993 (Interference
with Peace Officer Making Lawful Arrest, class B misdemeanor).
(R. 1.)
2.
Amended Information filed March 14, 1994
(Disorderly Conduct, an infraction).
(R. 62.)
3.
April 25, 1994 Hearing Transcript of Court Trial.
(Original of Transcript filed in Court of Appeals as part of the
record on appeal.)

16

Tabl

I. J!/

1

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

3

AMERICAN FORK CITY,

4

A Municipal Corporation,

H ^

INFORMATION
Plaintiff,

5
6
7
8

vs.

Citation No.
Criminal No.

LYNCH, DAVID N.

^3//y/£^~f Mr

?

5 5 - E a s r ~ 3 0 0 North
~>&t
American Fork, UT 84003

Defendant.
9
The undersigned states on information and belief that
the Defendant committed the crime of INTERFERENCE WITH PEACE
11 OFFICER MAKING LAWFUL ARREST, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in
12 American Fork City, Utah County, on October 21, 1993, in
violation of Section 76-8-305 of the Ordinances of American Fork
13
City.
14
The act of the Defendant constituting the crime was that
15 the defendant had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable
care, should have had knowledge, that a peace officer was seeking
16
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the Defendant or
17 another and interfered with such arrest or detention by either:
18 (1) the use of force or any weapon, (2) the Defendant's refusal
to perform any act required by lawful order necessary to effect
19j
the arrest or detention and made by the peace officer involved
2 0 j in the arrest or (3) the Defendant's refusal to refrain from
21 I performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the
22
following witnesses: Officer Darren/Falslev.
23
10

24

AMERICAN F0RK CITY PROSECUTOR

Tab 2

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH

1
2
3

UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
A Municipal Corporation,

AMENDED INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

4

Citation No.
vs.

5
6

Criminal No. 931-1064
LYNCH, DAVID N.
30 East 300 North
American Fork, UT

7
DOB:

3-9-50

8
Defendant.

9
10

The undersigned, states on information and belief In that

11

the

12

CONDUCT, an infraction, in American Fork City, Utah County, on

13

October 21, 1993, in violation of Section 76-9-102 of the

14

Ordinances of American Fork City.

Defendant

committed

the

following

crime

of

DISORDERLY

15

The act of Defendant constituting the crime was that the

16

Defendant, intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or

17

alarm or recklessly creating a risk thereof, engaged in fighting

18

or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or made

19

unreasonable noises in a public place; or made unreasonable

20

noises in a private place which could be heard in a public place;

21

or engaged

22

gestures in a public place.

23
24

in abusive or obscene language or made obscene

This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses:

Officer Darren Falslev.

WutffDffi-'iH

Vf\OV

r-TTV

TyDnCETTTTVYD

Tab 3

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

1
2

OREM DEPARTMENT

3

-oOo-

4

AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

5
6

vs.

7

DAVID LYNCH,

Case No. 931-1064
REVIEW HEARING

ORIGINAL

Defendant.

8

-oOo-

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25th day of April,

11
12

1994,

the above-entitled action was held before the

13

HONORABLE JOSEPH I. DIMICK, sitting as Judge in the above-

14

named Court, and that the following proceedings were had.
-0O0-
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A P P E A R A N C E S

16
17

For the City:

JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN
Attorney at Law
Harding & Associates
306 West Main
American Fork, Utah
84003

For the Defendant:

D. JOHN MUSSELMAN
Attorney at Law
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah
84601

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

3
4

That brings us to our 11:00 o'clock,

which is American Fork vs. David Lynch.

5

Parities rea<iy?

6

MR. MUSSELMAN:

7

MR. HANSEN:

8

THE COURT:

9

We're ready, your Honor.

We're ready, your Honor.
It's our File No. 931-1064.

This case

was trie d to \a jury, \rfhich was unable to reach a dlecision,
A week prior to that trial, the City

10

re-set f or trial.

11

again, in the process of amending its charge, set that for

12

hearing together with what I expected to be the trial on

13

March 23 rd.

'rhat is :not how we communicated it tc> Counsel.

Granted the City's motion to amend to disorderly

14
15

conduct as an infract ion and re-set this time for trial, and

16

we discussed 1then manners in which the parties wouild proceed

17

with the presentation of the case.
(Wh(sreupon, the Court handled an unrelated

18
19

matter.)

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. HANSEN:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. MUSSELMAN:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. HANSEN:

City ready?
We are, your Honor.
Defense ready?
We're ready, your Honor.

How do you want to proceed?
It's my understanding that you're
2

1

going to take judicial notice of everything that occurred in

2

the trial; that being the case, the City has no further

3

evidence to present and would rest.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. MUSSELMAN:

6

Mr. Musselman?
We're prepared to argue it, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

7

Well, let's just make sure that I know

8

what I'm taking judicial notice of.

9

prefer to proceed.
The evidence began with—help me with names; is it

10
11

Stewart that was the City's first witness?
MR. HANSEN:

12
13
14

That's the way I'd

I believe it was.

Officer James

Stewart.
THE COURT:

Who told us about his investigation of

15

theft from the apartment complex, finding a car that was

16

similar to it several days later, seeing the car,

17

approaching, asking about —asking—help me again with

18

Mr. Lynch's niece's name?

19

MR. HANSEN:

Kirstie or Kristie or —

20

MR. MUSSELMAN:

21

MR. HANSEN:

22

THE COURT:

Kirsten.

Kirsten.

And the other —

Told us about finding the other young

23

gentleman present and over to the side of the convenience

24

store there; their names?

25

MR. HANSEN:

Travis Cook.
3

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. HANSEN:

And?
I don't recall the other two

3

gentlemen that were there,

4

present,

5

were ever mentioned in Court•

I don't believe the other two gentlemen's names

6

THE COURT:

7

them, but they were.

8

Yeah, they were; not that I remember

MR. MUSSELMAN:

9

I know Angela Edwards was

Justin Thompson was one of them,

and Trevor something or other, but I don't see it in my

10 J notes.
THE COURT:

11

involved because she called--

12
13

Mechanically, Mr. Lynch becomes

I

14 i

MR. HANSEN:

What happened was-

THE COURT:

She called her mother.

Mr. Lynch's

15

son is progressing up the street, there was testimony of

16

words between Mr. Lynch's son and Mr. Stewart.

17

MR. HANSEN:

18

THE COURT:

That's correct.
A great deal of mention of the words.

19

An exchange of vulgarity.

20

Mr. Lynch to discontinue that and remain available.

21

Mr. Lynch told us that he began up the road where he

22

happened on to his family; is that the way that went?

23

MR. MUSSELMAN:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Mr. Stewart says that he told

Not quite, Judge.

Passed?
First of all, the young Lynch boys
4

1

were told to :leave, and they went home.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. MUSSELMAN:

It was Travis Cook who had left

4

and passed them on the street.

5

THE COURT:

Yes.

Travis Cook that the Lynches

6

tell us that they saw proceeding north on, what is that,

7

there?

Third or Second East?

8

MR. HANSEN:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. HANSEN:

12

THE COURT:

13

happ<*n.

14

witn<BSS' name

16
17

100 East, okay.

I'm understanding all

that about right, aren't I?

11

15

I believe it's 100 East.

Yes.
And then what brings us he re begins to

I don't remember the City's other—peace officer's

MR. HANSEN:

Darren Falslev, and we al so had Kris

Johnson, who :is the secretary, testify.
THE COURT:

Mr. Falslev and Mr. Stewar t tell us

18

that Mr. Lynch entered the scene, was demanding an

19

accoianting of what had been said, discovered his niece to be

20

the isubject matter of this investigation and was wanting to

21

know the status of that.

22

about what occurred at a very high volume, calle d their

23

dispatcher to say what she heard over the two-way, do not

24

indi<sate that they were about to make an arrest, except that

25

they then turned around to find Mr.--name again, the young

And the City began to complain

5

1

man?

2

MR. HANSEN:

3

THE COURT:

4

Travis Cook.
Travis Cook, who they say they had now

misl aid in the process.

Mr. Lynch's testimony absolutely denied the

5
6

volume, acknowledged wanting to call Mr. Stewart to account

7

for his language, acknowledged wanting to inquire into the

8

welf are of his niece.

9

a caill or the niece p laced a call, placed—causing a call to

10

be E>laced to his sist er.

MR. HANSEN:

11
12

I don't remember if he says he placed

The niece had placed a call

previously, but then after Mr. Lynch arrived, I believe

13 I Mr. Lynch did call from the pay phone there.
14

MR. MUSSELMAN:

15

THE COURT:

16

(Inaudible)

Do I recall what it is you want me to

recall?
Isn't that what happened?

17

MR. HANSEN:

18

MR. MUSSELMAN:

19

MR. HANSEN:

20

Yes.

That's what happened.

The officer testified that he told

Mr. Lyn<sh to leave th e area, not go to the phone, and

21 ! Mr. Lyn<c h ~
22
23

THE COURT:

Is there any other portion of the

presentation of your case you wish me to take notice of?

24

MR. HANSEN:

25

THE COURT:

No, I think that's it.
How about the defense?
6

1

MR. M U S S E L M A N :
Officer

I think that's e s s e n t i a l l y

2

I remember

Falslev's

testimony

3

it was that M r . Lynch, after b r e a k i n g

4

moving back over to his car, then came back in the

5

direction.

6

h e r e , M r . Lynch said,

O f f i c e r Falslev said,
I'm going

correctly,
contact

or

it.

If

I believe
whatever,
general

I told you to get

out

to the p h o n e , w h i c h he

of
did,

7 I the pay p h o n e on the w a l l .
8

|

THE C O U R T :

9 I account

of it was

Yeah.

that

M r . Lynch's p r e s e n c e m u c h

11

"not now,

MR. H A N S E N :

13

THE C O U R T :

14

volume.

15

w e r e some other

MR. H A N S E N :
took the stand

20
21
22 I

23

THE C O U R T :
inquiring

about.

That's

They say it went
account

interesting

or hurt,

right.

of that

witnesses

the d e f e n s e ' s

exchange

of

right.

on and on at

high

is, although

there

that,

account

m u c h M r . Lynch and his wife and who

Harris

with

longer than any simple

That's

The d e f e n s e ' s

16 I they helped

19

to deal

City's

later".

12

18

testi--the

they were having

10

17

The City's

I don't know
of that,

and A n g e l a Edwards

took the

It was A n g e l a E d w a r d s who

MR. M U S S E L M A N :

pretty

else?

Travis Cook took the stand,

I don't

Kirstie
stand.

I was

know w h o that helped

or hurt.

A n g e l a was the young

lady who

been in the car and t h e r e f o r e was in the v i c i n i t y when

24 I car was stopped,

let's see, and what

25 I Travis Cook, K i r s t i e H a r r i s , K a t r i n a
7

who

the City says is
Lynch, who is

had
the

right,

David's

wife, the City called James Stewart for a brief rebuttal,
and that was it.
THE COURT:

Basically, what I'm being asked to

decide, I believe, is the accounts of Mr. Stewart,
Mr. Falslev, Mr. Lync h, Mrs. Lynch, and I'm sorry, the
niece's name eludes me again.
MR. MUSSELMAN:
MR. HANSEN:
THE COURT:

Kirstie Harris.

Kirstie Harris.
Do I take note of what you want me to

make note of?
MR. MUSSELMAN:

I think so, your Honor.

Beyond

that, I think it's a matter of argument as to the weight or
the meaning of that evidence as far as this — the theory of
the charge now.
THE COURT:

What is the theory of your charge?

MR. HANSEN:

The theory is that the defendant

caused public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly created a risk thereof, when he approached the
officers, was shouting, attracted attention from a lot of
different people.
He was also making unreasonable noises in a publi
place.

The secretary could hear it from the two--way, very

clearly yelling, all the tumult, was very concerned about
it, and—and it carried on for a period of time, caused the
officer some concern and that's —that's —
8

!

THE COURT:

Argument?

2

MR. MUSSELMAN:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. MUSSELMAN:

5

My turn?

Uh huh (affirmative).
First of all, Judge, I think what

their theory is is well stated by counsel for the City.

As

6

| far as applying that to the facts, I suppose they would say

7

I that Mr. Lynch was guilty of making an unreasonable noise in

8

a public place by having this conversation with the officers

9

at a decibel level which they described as being loud and

10

shouting.
I disagree with the characterization of the

11
12
13

testimony of the dispatcher, Kristine Johnson.

As I recall

her testimony, it was that over — that she had radioed to

14

contact the officers, took a few minutes to contact them.

15

When they did res—when whichever officer it was that

16

responded, that she could hear voices in the background,

17

that she could hear what she perceived to be either loud

18

talking or shouting, she could not identify who was doing ny

19

of that loud talking or shouting.

20

characterized it.

21

Now—

22

THE COURT:

23

And that's how she

She spoke of--spoke of an accent, the

purpose of which was to identify it as —

24

25 | accent.

MR. MUSSELMAN:

She did say that the person had an

She couldn't be any more precise than that, as I
9

j

recall; in fact, the words I wrote down from her testimony

2

were, "person had accent1', and I think that's essentially

3

what she said.

4

The testimony from Mr. Lynch and the witnesses who

5

testified during the defense essentially was that there was

6

not an argument, that there was not shouting and that there

7

was not yelling and that there was a conversation and that

8

it was brief; that he approached and said, Is it true that

9

you cussed at my son, the officer said yes, but he cussed at

10

me first, or—or yes, and why did you do that, 'cause he

11

cussed at me first or whatever.

12

A brief conversation, then a direction to leave

13

and then a statement, I have one more question, I need to

14

know your--I want to know your name and information because

15

I'm making a complaint; that was provided, I think by way of

16

a card, if I remember right, anyway, it was provided.

17
18
19

Right, yeah.

It was after the comment of making a

complaint that he was told to leave.
In any event, he began to leave, turned, came

20

back, asked what the status was of the investigation,

21

because it was his niece in the car, again was told, none of

22

your business and told to leave, began to leave, then came

23

back to the phone and then called.

24
25

The question is, I suppose, regardless of which of
those versions you subscribe to, whether you—whether as a
10

1

matter

of fact you accept

at face v a l u e what

2

say or what

the d e f e n s e w i t n e s s e s said,

3

assume that

the truth

4

question

5

statutory

6

p l a c e , or any of the other

7

or v i o l e n t ,

8

think they

lies s o m e w h e r e

i s , does any of that

the

officers

or if t h e — i f

in the m i d d l e ,

rise to the level

you

the

of

the

language of an u n r e a s o n a b l e n o i s e in a public

tumultuous
claim

language; of engaging

or t h r e a t e n i n g

behavior.

in

I don't

that.

9

Intending

or recklessly

10

THE C O U R T :

Citation,

11

MR. MUSSELMAN:

The s t a t u t e is 7 6 - 9 - 1 0 2 .

12

THE C O U R T :

ahead.

13

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Go

14 I the City is that he either
15

risk of public

16

s t a t u t e doesn't

17

to what

creating

a risk of —

please.

I think p a r t - - t h e
intended

inconvenience,

other theory

or recklessly

annoyance

give us anything

those things

18

fighting

created a

or alarm.

Well,

the

in the way of d e f i n i t i o n

as

are.

There is a case that w a s , let's s e e , a 1989

19

of A p p e a l s

case, State v s . R i c h a r d s , w h i c h

20

directly, necessarily,

21

but i n d i r e c t l y ,

22

was that

23

u n r e a s o n a b l e n o i s e in a p r i v a t e p l a c e that

24

a public p l a c e , w h i c h is some of the a l t e r n a t e

25

the

in that

of

applies

to the facts of this

it helps a little bit.

The holding

case, the o b l i g a t i o n was

statute.

11

I think

Court

it
case,
there

making
could be heard
language

of

in

1

They talked about voices, there appeared to be a

2

confrontation, an argument, in other words, but that

3

conversation wasn f t loud enough to be understood outside,

4

could not be classified as unreasonable noise.

5

guess once again unreasonable noise is what we're trying to

6

define.

7

And un--I

I suppose in the officers' opinion, what they have

8

described in their opinion is unreasonable noise.

I'm not

9

sure that makes it unreasonable noise within the meaning or

10

the definition of the statute, even if we accept their

11

version of it, the way that they presented it.

12

I don't think it constitutes a public

13

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm either.

14

that language comes essentially from the riot or the

15

unlawful assembly-type of language, and as a matter of fact,

16

Section 102, the preceding section, 76-9-101 is the riot

17

statute, and this is in that section of the code.

18

Historically,

What we're talking about here is holding up

19

traffic, disrupting business, and

20

interfering with all of the legitimate concerns that the

21

public has a right to engage in and not have to put up with

22

some big demonstration.

23

I maintain that what happened doesn't come close to fitting

24

that definition.

25

essentially--essentially

Well, that's not what happened, and

The remainder of the language in the code is
12

1

engaging is abusive or obscene language or making obscene

2

gestures.

3

I don't think the City claims that.
The long and the short of it is, what we heard

4

from the evidence in this courtroom, even if you take it in

5

the light least favorable to the defendant, does not make a

6

violation of this code; and if you weigh the evidence out,

7

it has to be taken in a light more favorable to the

8

defendant.

9

prove its case.

And we maintain that the City has failed to

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HANSEN:

Do you want to respond?
I think the case that Mr. Musselman

12

cited is clearly distinguishable.

13

charging it as unreasonable noise in a private place that

14

could be heard in a public place, they didn't feel was

15

unreasonable because in the public place, you couldn't even

16

understand what they were saying.

17

was unreasonably loud, you would at least be able to

18

understand what the people were saying.

19

The fact that they were

They figured that if it

I think that it comes down to the question of

20

which—of

credibility of witnesses.

21

facts happened as the City's witnesses testified to them,

22

that the noises that were made were unreasonable in a public

23

place; it was in the parking lot of a Maxi-Mart

24

store, you've got public there, and you've got this going on

25

for much longer than it should have, the officer is required
13

I think if--if the

convenience

1

to stay there much longer, causing inconvenience to the

2

store and people that are trying to--to come there to the

3

store, and I think it fits within both unreasonable noise in

4

a public place and recklessly causing public

5

and annoyance to the area,

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. MUSSELMAN:

inconvenience

Do you want to add anything?
One thing, Judge.

Counsel for the

8

City referred to--or I think the language he chose was the

9

noise being unreasonably loud.

There's nothing in the

10

statute that talks about unreasonably loud.

11

unreasonable noise.

12

whether it means unreasonable because of the language or

13

because of there being some threatening language or

14

demeanor, the statute, frankly, doesn't help us with the

15

definition.

16
17
18

MR. HANSEN:
say loud.

It's an

Whether that means unreasonably loud or

And I apologize.

I didn't mean to

Unreasonable is what I meant.
MR. MUSSELMAN:

I understand, and you know, it's a

19

fair inference that maybe is talking about loud, but it

20

doesn't say that.

21

Furthermore, I think that the Court heard

22

Mr. Lynch when he testified.

Mr. Lynch has a rather deep

23

and a rather resonating voice, and I think sometimes at the

24

louder end of his conversational tones, he might be

25

perceived as, whether shouting or talking loudly, without it
14

1

being in any respect of the word u n r e a s o n a b l e .

2

THE C O U R T :

Anything

3

MR. MUSSELMAN:

4

THE C O U R T :

else?

We'll submit

it.

W e l l , frankly, I'm thinking my way

5

through this is what you observe, I m e a n at this m o m e n t .

I

6

am not trying to prepare a lead-in to my decision as m u c h as

7 I I am trying to m a k e it.
8

I don't think these ideas are too abstract.

9 | first paragraph,
9

This

engaging in fighting or other violent,

10

tumultuous or threatening behavior; I don't think the City

11

asserts that.

12

think there was no physical harm threatened, I don't

13

they p r o p o s e that.

14

I don't think there was a fight proposed, I
think

In terms of u n r e a s o n a b l e noises in a public p l a c e ,

15

I think they propose that d i r e c t l y .

I don't have any

16

difficulty construing the meaning of that language so that

17 I an ongoing, full-voiced, half shouted argument with police
18

and conducting an investigation in this busy place is

19 J capable of carrying that burden of proof for the City.
20 | should imagine it would be one of the principal

I

types of

21 | applications for that language, very easy conclusion for m e .
22 |

I don't think any of the language would have to do

23 I with language or gestures would apply; so I think
24

literally,

what I'm being asked to do is give meaning to the word

25 I "unreasonable n o i s e " .

In the first p l a c e , I think you've
15

1

got to choose between which of these scenarios, and I don't

2

think it's in terms of credibility.

3

Memory and perception is so self-serving, the

4

question is never who's l y i n g — a l m o s t never.

5

part of this case.

6

That is not

Human nature is absolutely primed and ready and

7

goes about life seeing things in ways that are favorable to

8

them and unfavorable to others; that is how we conduct

9

ourselves.

10

And in cases where neutral eyewitnesses would all

11

join one side of the argument, the other side would all pass

12

polygraphs supporting they are truthful in their version of

13

it.

14

it.

15

Credibility in that application has nothing to do with

This was an emotional event.

Witnesses from both

16

sides were continuing to allow their egos and their

17

personalities to clash at trial.

18

this were enormously important.

19

that way and I really don't like it.

Cases--I think I

20

showed that reaction to it at trial.

I think it took about

21

20 minutes of this trial to thoroughly wear me out.

22
23
24
25

The personal aspects of
I don't know how it got

I don't think people treating each other in the
way each other deserves to be treated get here.
Having said all of that, I think I'm being asked
to decide if the City's carried its burden of proof, and not
16

1

just that it b e g a n in a loud and c o n f r o n t i v e m a n n e r , but

2

that it c o n t i n u e d past being asked to d i s c o n t i n u e .

3

that's sort of built into it.

4

I think

I think if the p o l i c e say, that's enough, not n o w ,

5

and M r . L y n c h r e t i r e s , I don't think that's an o f f e n s e , and

6

that is what he says he did.

7

c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n the City gives it in the first p l a c e , but

8

he says he retired w h e n he was asked to.

9 I

He disputes

the

If t h e r e ' s r e a s o n a b l e doubt of that, there will

be

10

an a c q u i t t a l .

I think the c h a r a c t e r of t h e s e events that

11

could support the C i t y ' s case is that he didn't r e t i r e , that

12

it went on, p e r s i s t e d .
I think if I find the C i t y ' s c a r r i e d their

13

burden

14

of proof on that, then I think there will be a c o n v i c t i o n .

15

I don't think I'm being asked to d e c i d e m o r e or less than

16

that; I think that's the issue as I u n d e r s t a n d

17 I

it.

W i t h respect to that, most of what the d e f e n s e

18

p r e s e n t e d d e n i e d c o n t i n u i n g , d e n i e d the v o l u m e , too.

19

parts of what the City p r e s e n t e d had to do w i t h them h a v i n g

20

to deal w i t h that and repeated r e q u e s t s to w i t h d r a w ,

21

r e t i r e , to quit, to let them do what they n e e d e d to do w e r e

22 I ignored, w h i l e the point was m a d e several

25 |

to

times.

I think the C i t y ' s carried its b u r d e n of p r o o f ,

23
24

All

Mr. Lynch.

I return a verdict of guilty as
Stand up to the b e n c h ,
17

please?

charged.

1

How old are you, Mr. Lynch?

2

MR. LYNCH:

Forty-five, your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

You're married and have several

5

MR. LYNCH:

I have four sons.

6

THE COURT:

What's your employment?

7

MR. LYNCH:

I am a (inaudible) and framer.

8

THE COURT:

Self-employed?

9

MR. LYNCH:

No.

10

THE COURT:

Who do you work for?

11

MR. LYNCH:

I work for Ralph Christensen of

4

12
13
14

children?

Christensen Construct ion.
THE COURT:

Is there anything of any kind on your

record other 1than thi s?

15

MR. LYNCH:

No, sir.

16

THE COURT:

Do you want to proceed now?

17

MR. MUSSELMAN:

18

THE COURT:

19

We would, your Honor.

Is there any reason I shouldn't see

this as a minor matter?

20

Do ;you want to be heard any further?

21

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Briefly, Judge.

Other than what

22

I've already isaid to the Court, I think it's fairly clear

23

that we've got a clas h of personalities that resulted in

24

this between Mr. Lync h and at least Officer Falslev and to

25

lesser extent , Officer Stewart.
18

It--

1
2
3

THE C O U R T :

W e l l , I d o n f t know w h e r e that

started,

but it was certainly in place at trial.
MR. MUSSELMAN:

I think there's been something,

4

some history as far as communication b e t w e e n M r . Lynch and

5

his family and certain members of the A m e r i c a n Fork Police

6

Force and I think that contributed to it.

7

Essentially, s o m e — s o m e — s h a l 1

8

blood, I g u e s s , I don't know, for lack of a better

9

between the police and some of the family m e m b e r s .

10

I guess some bad
term,

M r . Lynch, I think, testified that the p u r p o s e of

11

going down there was to inquire further about the

12

confrontation m o m e n t s earlier between his son, C h r i s , where

13

Chris said that the one officer had swore at him, and he

14

went down there to find out who it w a s , with the full

15

of making a complaint

16

he m a d e ; apparently, nothing came of that, other than the

17

fact that M r . Lynch was charged with this.

18

con—the

intent

to the chief of p o l i c e , which in fact

There obviously was a conversation and to some

19

extent, a confrontation, I understand the Court's found that

20

the City's met its burden and we don't m e a n to re-argue that

21

by any m e a n s ; but if this is a violation of the statute,

22

suggest that it's a very m i n o r , perhaps as minor a v i o l a t i o n

23

you can have and still violate a s t a t u t e , if it rises to

24

that level .

25

And I would think that — that the Court ought
19

to

I'd

1

treat it as that and e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f u s e the s i t u a t i o n

2

rather than adding fuel to the fire, so to s p e a k .

3

THE C O U R T :

W e l l , I don't intend to add fuel

to

4

the fire, I intend to reserve jurisdiction over it, and

5

w h a t e v e r else I get done w i t h t h i s , I do intend to m a k e end

6

of it.

7

Things are m i n o r in terms of d e s e r v i n g

8

accountability

9

great deal if I am unable to affect

10

for them.

MR. M U S S E L M A N :

My p e r s p e c t i v e on that changes a
outcome.

W e l l , it n e e d s t o — c e r t a i n l y

needs

11

to end.

12

know that anything that this Court does today will

13

n e c e s s a r i l y have an effect on that.

14

feel that they've been m i s t r e a t e d by the A m e r i c a n

Fork

15

P o l i c e ; and I think the A m e r i c a n Fork P o l i c e feel

that

16

they've had every reason to do what they've done and m o r e of

17

it.

18

I don't know that — as far as the h i s t o r y , I don't

THE C O U R T :

I think the Lynches

In w h i c h — i n w h i c h case, the

19

resolution for it is for both sides to m a k e sure the other

20

is treated with the proper amount of respect and

21

and

civility.

22

MR. M U S S E L M A N :

23

THE C O U R T :

24
25

courtesy

Couldn't agree m o r e w i t h that.

I impose a fine of $50 without

other order.
Do you want time to pay it, M r . Lynch?
20

any

1

MR. LYNCH:

No, sir.

I'll pay it right now.

2

THE COURT:

If you will present your copy of the

3

minutes out at the counter, I expect it will be self-

4

explanatory there.

5

Thank you.

We're in recess.

6

MR. MUSSELMAN:

7

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

Thank you.
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